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#World1991: How did the United States and Iraq produce strategic misjudgments?

2026-07-12·x-repost-20260712-164507

#World1991: How did the United States and Iraq produce strategic misjudgments? ## Why should the United States care about this matter? Kuwait is not a U.S. protectorate, and there is no defense treaty between the two countries.

What made the United States launch Operation Desert Shield almost without hesitation within 48 hours was that Iraq began to deviate from the established track set by the United States for the Middle East.

Downstream suppliers are most afraid of suppliers cannibalizing each other, and most hope that suppliers will be broken up so that they can get the best price—— Once Saddam annexes Kuwait, he will have a total of 20% of proven oil reserves. At that time, the Iraqi army was not only in southern Kuwait, but also on the Saudi border.

Less than 500 kilometers ahead is the Khurais super oil field cluster in eastern Saudi Arabia. It was the largest oil field in the world at the time and accounted for half of Saudi Arabia's production capacity. If the US military did not act, Saddam could even obtain this place within 24 hours, and then occupy 40%-50% of the world's oil reserves.

With the occupation of Kuwait, oil prices have soared from 14 US dollars to 40 US dollars, and Saddam is about to double-click 666 (both oil fields and oil prices have risen) , Americans could no longer sit still. According to the calculation of oil prices at that time, for every US$5 increase in oil prices, US GDP growth would decrease by 0.5%.

From the beginning of the 1970s to now, Americans' fear of rising oil prices in the past 20 years has been engraved in the bones of a generation. Once a "regional hegemon" emerges in the Gulf, the [Moderate Arab GCC-Free America] structure that the United States has built with difficulty throughout the 20th century will collapse directly.

The [oil-dollar] structure will also be shaky. And why emphasize the word "free America"? Because the United States did think so at the time. In 1990, it happened to be the time when the Berlin Wall fell, Eastern Europe was undergoing drastic changes, and the Soviet Union was about to liberalize.

The United States began to prepare for its new identity-"the only superpower on the Blue Star". An evil military dictator and a free America, an evil country that invades other countries' territories and "occupies" oil resources, and an America that stands up to uphold justice and restore world order.

These contrasting narratives have been perfectly engraved in the minds of the American and even Western people. This is completely different from the anti-Vietnam War in the 1970s.

## Fatal miscarriage of justice Before the Iraqi army entered Kuwait on August 2, and before the tough talks between Iraq and Kuwait collapsed on July 31, Saddam really asked the American boss what he thought. His most accurate source of information came from the U.S. ambassador to Iraq on July 25. Saddam summoned U.S.

Ambassador Glaspie and explained Iraq's position on the action against Kuwait: 1. There will be no serious action during the negotiation window. He was referring to the fact that there would be no action before July 31. 2.

If the talks break down or are coerced by the United States, Iraq can only respond (actually this response is an invasion, but it is not stated clearly). In fact, the United States has been following up on and concerned about the escalation of conflicts between Iraq and Kuwait, especially since Iraq has gathered troops on the border.

At the same time, the United States did not support Iraq's request for debt relief. Saddam also regarded this as a humiliation: Iraq suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties and was also avenging the United States for being driven out of Tehran.

As a professional bureaucrat, Glaspie is of course also based on "American strength" and is "seriously concerned" about this naked border deployment.

but in the end She still followed the consistent position of the US State Department: leave the conflict to be resolved within the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (indeed, Egypt's Mubarak also had a phone call with Saddam during the meeting). One of her most critical mistakes was that she did not get the "response" = "war" in Saddam's mouth.

Therefore, she did not make one thing clear throughout the whole process: "If you take action, the United States will not sit idly by." She emphasized at the end of the meeting: "We have no opinion on your Arab–Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait." "no opinion", do not hold a view.

In the original manuscript that Iraq sent to the media that night, there was also "Normally that would be none of our business" (generally speaking, it has nothing to do with us) "in the spirit of friendship—not "confrontation" (hoping to deal with it based on friendship rather than confrontation) Saddam's translation was correct.

This sentence came into his ears, which was "Okay, I understand, the United States will not interfere with our affairs." Whenever there was a threatening word, Saddam had to go back and think about it for a few more days, or make a few more calls to Washington to confirm.

## Things can be sorted out clearly here: Saddam did not clearly express his willingness for war. In the face of the FACT (fact) that US Ambassador Glaspie has hundreds of thousands of troops on the border, as a superpower with huge influence on the region, there is no basic and clear "safeguard" (the United States will intervene once force is used).

If Saddam made a big mistake, Glaspie made an even bigger professional mistake - of course, it is Saddam who is responsible for it. Of course, it's not Glaspie's fault alone.

Saddam, of course, received various messages from Washington throughout the Iraq-Kuwait standoff, including: The spokesperson of the State Department repeatedly emphasized that "the United States does not take a position on the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait" and "has no defense treaty obligations with Kuwait." At the urgent House of Representatives

hearing on July 31, when asked, "How would you react if Iraq crosses the border into Kuwait?" "The assistant secretary still responded: "There is no defense agreement with Kuwait... So I can't answer the "hypothesis" you mentioned. The CIA's intelligence assessment is that Saddam's 100,000 troops are just blackmail.

In the end, there is a high probability that it will be debt extortion and land demand, and there will be no complete annexation.

The United States placed its hope on the Arab brothers in the GCC to solve the problem on their own, and Mubarak acted as a guarantor and told the United States: "Saddam promised me that he would never fight." So in this unified voice, how dare Glaspie "make his own decisions" and put out the safety catch that "the United States will intervene if force is used"?

Therefore, this deliberate vagueness and unclearness of strategic intentions was initiated by the United States itself in order to hand over the problems to others (within the GCC) to solve. And I just want to be the "ultimate fire-fighter" and "ultimate arbiter".

The United States wanted to leave it to the Arab brothers to solve the problem, and Saddam realized this. Therefore, after looking around for a week, he found that "none of the Arab brothers could fight", so he took action directly.

Later, the American diplomatic community specially made this matter a lesson: Never say "not taking a stance" to a person who will translate "not taking a stance" into "you agree with me to do anything." Therefore, after 1991, the United States re-emphasized "strategic red lines" and "conclusion setting" - but it went to the extreme again in 2003.

When facing Saddam Hussein again in 2003, Rumsfeld could take out a bag of "washing powder" as a reason to send troops, all just to achieve the established goal: to overthrow Saddam Hussein. From "putting out fires afterwards" to "strike first to gain the upper hand". ## Will there be a strategic misjudgment between China and the United States?

Why should this matter be mentioned again here carefully? Because it is still worth learning and thinking about: Where is our strategic red line? Where is the strategic red line for the United States (in the Western Pacific)? How can China and the United States avoid strategic misjudgments?

With our current national strength, our red lines are of course "the inherent territory is indivisible" and "this is China's internal affairs." We have domestic laws and international laws (the United Nations recognizes our conclusion, and the Yalta system still recognizes it). We have never given up the use of force.

We have "soldiers" on this side of the Taiwan Strait, and gradually we also have "soldiers" on the "other side" of the Taiwan Strait (the first island chain in the Western Pacific). But what about America?

They have a security and defense treaty with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines in the Western Pacific, and the Seventh Fleet is still cruising in our waters. They also have domestic laws (Taiwan Relations Act), and they oppose unilateral force changes in the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

These nonsense are untenable in our country and internationally, but they may still be the key basis for domestic decision-making in the United States. Where is their strategic red line in the Western Pacific? What are the conclusions drawn from their domestic politics? How should we understand this?

If we simply believe that this is our internal affairs and the United States should not intervene, that would be too strategically naive. From Washington to California, the United States’ China policies and voices are also very diverse. It is also naive if we unilaterally believe the information or even the guarantee of a certain channel.

In the past ten years, China and the United States have fought in the South China Sea. Neither side is a young man. They are still like two masters fighting each other, focusing on reaching a point and never crossing the line. However, this time the United States was dragged into the Iran war by Israel's Netar and was eventually drawn to a draw.

It has to be said that its strategic focus may have declined visibly. We are not like Iraq. We have sufficient strategic determination, strength and the ability to evaluate strength. We also hope that our old rival, the United States, still has strategic determination and the ability to evaluate its true strength at this stage.

Full text

#World1991: How did the United States and Iraq produce strategic misjudgments?

#World1991: How did the United States and Iraq produce strategic misjudgments? ## Why should the United States care about this matter? Kuwait is not a U.S. protectorate, and there is no defense treaty between the two countries. What made the United States launch Operation Desert Shield almost without hesitation within 48 hours was that Iraq began to deviate from the established track set by the United States for the Middle East. Downstream suppliers are most afraid of suppliers cannibalizing each other, and most hope that suppliers will be broken up so that they can get the best price—— Once Saddam annexes Kuwait, he will have a total of 20% of proven oil reserves. At that time, the Iraqi army was not only in southern Kuwait, but also on the Saudi border. Less than 500 kilometers ahead is the Khurais super oil field cluster in eastern Saudi Arabia. It was the largest oil field in the world at the time and accounted for half of Saudi Arabia's production capacity. If the US military did not act, Saddam could even obtain this place within 24 hours, and then occupy 40%-50% of the world's oil reserves. With the occupation of Kuwait, oil prices have soared from 14 US dollars to 40 US dollars, and Saddam is about to double-click 666 (both oil fields and oil prices have risen) , Americans could no longer sit still. According to the calculation of oil prices at that time, for every US$5 increase in oil prices, US GDP growth would decrease by 0.5%. From the beginning of the 1970s to now, Americans' fear of rising oil prices in the past 20 years has been engraved in the bones of a generation. Once a "regional hegemon" emerges in the Gulf, the [Moderate Arab GCC-Free America] structure that the United States has built with difficulty throughout the 20th century will collapse directly. The [oil-dollar] structure will also be shaky. And why emphasize the word "free America"? Because the United States did think so at the time. In 1990, it happened to be the time when the Berlin Wall fell, Eastern Europe was undergoing drastic changes, and the Soviet Union was about to liberalize. The United States began to prepare for its new identity-"the only superpower on the Blue Star". An evil military dictator and a free America, an evil country that invades other countries' territories and "occupies" oil resources, and an America that stands up to uphold justice and restore world order. These contrasting narratives have been perfectly engraved in the minds of the American and even Western people. This is completely different from the anti-Vietnam War in the 1970s. ## Fatal miscarriage of justice Before the Iraqi army entered Kuwait on August 2, and before the tough talks between Iraq and Kuwait collapsed on July 31, Saddam really asked the American boss what he thought. His most accurate source of information came from the U.S. ambassador to Iraq on July 25. Saddam summoned U.S. Ambassador Glaspie and explained Iraq's position on the action against Kuwait: 1. There will be no serious action during the negotiation window. He was referring to the fact that there would be no action before July 31. 2. If the talks break down or are coerced by the United States, Iraq can only respond (actually this response is an invasion, but it is not stated clearly). In fact, the United States has been following up on and concerned about the escalation of conflicts between Iraq and Kuwait, especially since Iraq has gathered troops on the border. At the same time, the United States did not support Iraq's request for debt relief. Saddam also regarded this as a humiliation: Iraq suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties and was also avenging the United States for being driven out of Tehran. As a professional bureaucrat, Glaspie is of course also based on "American strength" and is "seriously concerned" about this naked border deployment. but in the end She still followed the consistent position of the US State Department: leave the conflict to be resolved within the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (indeed, Egypt's Mubarak also had a phone call with Saddam during the meeting). One of her most critical mistakes was that she did not get the "response" = "war" in Saddam's mouth. Therefore, she did not make one thing clear throughout the whole process: "If you take action, the United States will not sit idly by." She emphasized at the end of the meeting: "We have no opinion on your Arab–Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait." "no opinion", do not hold a view. In the original manuscript that Iraq sent to the media that night, there was also "Normally that would be none of our business" (generally speaking, it has nothing to do with us) "in the spirit of friendship—not "confrontation" (hoping to deal with it based on friendship rather than confrontation) Saddam's translation was correct. This sentence came into his ears, which was "Okay, I understand, the United States will not interfere with our affairs." Whenever there was a threatening word, Saddam had to go back and think about it for a few more days, or make a few more calls to Washington to confirm. ## Things can be sorted out clearly here: Saddam did not clearly express his willingness for war. In the face of the FACT (fact) that US Ambassador Glaspie has hundreds of thousands of troops on the border, as a superpower with huge influence on the region, there is no basic and clear "safeguard" (the United States will intervene once force is used). If Saddam made a big mistake, Glaspie made an even bigger professional mistake - of course, it is Saddam who is responsible for it. Of course, it's not Glaspie's fault alone. Saddam, of course, received various messages from Washington throughout the Iraq-Kuwait standoff, including: The spokesperson of the State Department repeatedly emphasized that "the United States does not take a position on the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait" and "has no defense treaty obligations with Kuwait." At the urgent House of Representatives hearing on July 31, when asked, "How would you react if Iraq crosses the border into Kuwait?" "The assistant secretary still responded: "There is no defense agreement with Kuwait... So I can't answer the "hypothesis" you mentioned. The CIA's intelligence assessment is that Saddam's 100,000 troops are just blackmail. In the end, there is a high probability that it will be debt extortion and land demand, and there will be no complete annexation. The United States placed its hope on the Arab brothers in the GCC to solve the problem on their own, and Mubarak acted as a guarantor and told the United States: "Saddam promised me that he would never fight." So in this unified voice, how dare Glaspie "make his own decisions" and put out the safety catch that "the United States will intervene if force is used"? Therefore, this deliberate vagueness and unclearness of strategic intentions was initiated by the United States itself in order to hand over the problems to others (within the GCC) to solve. And I just want to be the "ultimate fire-fighter" and "ultimate arbiter". The United States wanted to leave it to the Arab brothers to solve the problem, and Saddam realized this. Therefore, after looking around for a week, he found that "none of the Arab brothers could fight", so he took action directly. Later, the American diplomatic community specially made this matter a lesson: Never say "not taking a stance" to a person who will translate "not taking a stance" into "you agree with me to do anything." Therefore, after 1991, the United States re-emphasized "strategic red lines" and "conclusion setting" - but it went to the extreme again in 2003. When facing Saddam Hussein again in 2003, Rumsfeld could take out a bag of "washing powder" as a reason to send troops, all just to achieve the established goal: to overthrow Saddam Hussein. From "putting out fires afterwards" to "strike first to gain the upper hand". ## Will there be a strategic misjudgment between China and the United States? Why should this matter be mentioned again here carefully? Because it is still worth learning and thinking about: Where is our strategic red line? Where is the strategic red line for the United States (in the Western Pacific)? How can China and the United States avoid strategic misjudgments? With our current national strength, our red lines are of course "the inherent territory is indivisible" and "this is China's internal affairs." We have domestic laws and international laws (the United Nations recognizes our conclusion, and the Yalta system still recognizes it). We have never given up the use of force. We have "soldiers" on this side of the Taiwan Strait, and gradually we also have "soldiers" on the "other side" of the Taiwan Strait (the first island chain in the Western Pacific). But what about America? They have a security and defense treaty with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines in the Western Pacific, and the Seventh Fleet is still cruising in our waters. They also have domestic laws (Taiwan Relations Act), and they oppose unilateral force changes in the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. These nonsense are untenable in our country and internationally, but they may still be the key basis for domestic decision-making in the United States. Where is their strategic red line in the Western Pacific? What are the conclusions drawn from their domestic politics? How should we understand this? If we simply believe that this is our internal affairs and the United States should not intervene, that would be too strategically naive. From Washington to California, the United States’ China policies and voices are also very diverse. It is also naive if we unilaterally believe the information or even the guarantee of a certain channel. In the past ten years, China and the United States have fought in the South China Sea. Neither side is a young man. They are still like two masters fighting each other, focusing on reaching a point and never crossing the line. However, this time the United States was dragged into the Iran war by Israel's Netar and was eventually drawn to a draw. It has to be said that its strategic focus may have declined visibly. We are not like Iraq. We have sufficient strategic determination, strength and the ability to evaluate strength. We also hope that our old rival, the United States, still has strategic determination and the ability to evaluate its true strength at this stage.

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